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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the determinants of credit default swap spread changes for a large 
sample of US non-financial companies over the period between January 2002 and March 
2009. In our analysis we use variables that the literature has found have an impact on CDS 
spreads and, in order to account for possible non-linear effects, the theoretical CDS spreads 
predicted by the Merton model. We show that our set of variables is able to explain more 
than 50% of CDS spread variations both before and after July 2007, when the current 
financial turmoil began. We also document that since the onset of the crisis CDS spreads 
have become much more sensitive to the level of leverage while volatility has lost its 
importance. Using a principal component analysis we also show that since the beginning of 
the crisis CDS spread changes have been increasingly driven by a common factor, which 
cannot be explained by indicators of economic activity, uncertainty, and risk aversion. 
JEL Classification: G12, G13. 








2. A review of the literature on credit spreads.........................................................................7 
2.1  Main determinants of credit spreads.............................................................................7 
2.2 Empirical  studies ..........................................................................................................9 
3. Merton model.....................................................................................................................11 
4. Methodology......................................................................................................................13 
4.1 Data  description..........................................................................................................14 
4.2  Empirical models and testing methodology ...............................................................15 
5. Results................................................................................................................................17 
5.1  The pre-crisis period...................................................................................................17 
5.2  The crisis period .........................................................................................................18 
5.3 Further  analyses..........................................................................................................20 
6. Conclusion.........................................................................................................................21 
References..............................................................................................................................23 
Tables and figures...................................................................................................................26 
 
_______________________________________ 
* Bank of Italy, Economics, Research and International Relations.    1. Introduction
1
Empirical work on the determinants of credit risk { the risk of default of borrowers { has
traditionally looked at corporate spreads, that is spreads between corporate and govern-
ment bonds.2 The common nding has been that only a small share of observed spreads
can be actually considered as a compensation for the risk of default of borrowers, whereas
the greatest share can be traced back to taxes and liquidity issues, and to the presence
of other systematic risk factors (e.g. Elton et al., 2001, Amato and Remolona, 2005, and
Driessen, 2005).
Although the bond market has traditionally been regarded as the best place in which
the creditworthiness of a borrower can be evaluated, in recent years there has been a
huge development of nancial instruments, called credit derivatives, that are specically
designed to make credit risk easily tradable.3 Among these innovative instruments, credit
default swaps (CDSs) have proved particularly successful. Essentially, a CDS works like
an insurance contract: the policy holder (i.e. the buyer of protection) pays a premium to
the insurer (i.e. the seller of protection) in order to receive compensation if a particular
event occurs. In the case of CDSs this event, called a credit event, usually includes
bankruptcy, failure to pay and restructuring and, for sovereign issuers, repudiation and
moratoria. Generally speaking all these events are subsumed in the term \default". The
main dierence between a CDS and an insurance contract is that, while in the case of
insurance the policy holder gets a reimbursement only for the actual damages suered,
with a CDS it is possible to buy or sell protection against credit events independently from
the real exposure to the risk of default of the reference entity. A CDS can thus be used
not only for hedging credit risk but also for taking pure speculative positions, as with
forward and futures contracts. This aspect clearly distinguishes the CDS market from
the bond market. While the short selling of bonds, i.e. of credit risk, is usually limited
by the low level of liquidity of the repo market, especially for high-yield bonds, and by
the short maturity of repo contracts, CDSs allow investors to short sell credit risk easily.
Thanks to this characteristic, the CDS market has been growing dramatically during the
last few years. According to the International Swap and Derivatives Association (ISDA)
the notional value of outstanding CDSs has increased from 1 to 62 trillion USD between
2001 and 2007. The notional amount of outstanding CDSs was so large that it turned out
to be a serious potential source of instability during the nancial turmoil triggered by the
subprime crisis in the United States because of the corresponding counterparty risks. In
1The views expressed in the article are those of the authors and do not involve the responsibility
of the Bank of Italy. We would like to thank Giuseppe Cappelletti, Giuseppe Grande and Marcello
Pericoli for their helpful comments and suggestions. All remaining errors are our own. The original
version of this paper focused on CDSs denominated in euro; an electronic copy is currently available
at http://www.greta.it/credit/credit2005/Friday/Poster/05 DiCesare Guazzarotti.pdf. The most recent
version of this paper is forthcoming in Finance and Banking Developments, Charles V. Karsone (eds.),
New York, Nova Publishers.
2We use the terms \credit spreads" and \credit premia" as synonyms of \corporate spreads" and \CDS
spreads". By \corporate spreads" or \bond spreads" we mean the dierential between the yields of bonds
issued by private companies and the yields of government bonds with similar characteristics. We also use
the term \risk-free yields" as a synonym of \government bond yields".
3See the Committee on the Global Financial System (2003).
5order to reduce these risks, CDS market dealers started entering multilateral netting of
CDS contracts, thus reducing the notional amount of outstanding CDS to 39 trillion by
the end of 2008 (see European Central Bank, 2009a). According to Fitch Ratings (2006)
CDSs represent more than a half of the whole credit derivatives market.4
Because of its particular features, the CDS market is potentially much more ecient
than the bond market in signaling the creditworthiness of borrowers. The relationship
between bond and CDS markets has been the subject of several academic papers. Blanco
et al. (2005) nd that CDS and bond markets re
ect rm-specic characteristics equally
in the long run, while in the short run CDS prices appear to be more ecient than bond
spreads in the price discovery process. Zhu (2004) conrms that credit risk tends to be
priced equally in the two markets in the long run and that the derivatives market seems
to lead the cash market in anticipating rating events and in price adjustments. Other
literature (Hull et al., 2004, Norden and Weber, 2004, Di Cesare, 2005) which analyzes
the relationship between CDS spreads and credit ratings show that the CDS market is
usually very eective in anticipating rating changes.
The development of the CDS market has also attracted researchers' interest in analyz-
ing whether factors that determine corporate spreads are also relevant for CDS spreads.
As said before, the nature of CDSs is such that this question does not have an obvious
answer. The aim of this paper is to contribute to this literature by analyzing how the
recent nancial turmoil has changed the way that credit risk is priced in the CDS market.
Most of existing literature use data from the early stage of the CDS market only, thus
not taking into account more recent developments. To the best of our knowledge, only
Annaert et al. (2009) and Raunig and Scheicher (2009) analyze the period following the
onset of the current nancial turmoil in July 2007, but they focus on the banking sector.
Moreover, with the exception of Alexander and Kaeck (2008) and Pires et al. (2009),
no other paper takes into account the non-linear relationship between CDS spreads and
default factors. In this paper we use a large data set of CDS quotes on US non-nancial
companies from January 2002 to March 2009 that allow us to analyze the eects of the
recent nancial turmoil on the determinants of CDS spread changes. We also take into
account the issue of non-linearity by explicitly using a theoretical CDS spread calculated
using the Merton model in our regressions. In this respect, our paper is similar in spirit to
Bystr om (2006) which uses the CreditGrades model to calculate theoretical CDS spreads
and compare these with empirically observed spreads for CDS indices (iTraxx) covering
Europe. Bystr om (2006) nds that theoretical and empirical spread changes are signi-
cantly correlated. Given that the specic functional form provided by a theoretical model
could misspecify the true relationship between CDS spreads and default factors, we also
add in our regressions the single default factors separately as well as other factors that
theory and empirical evidence found to be signicant in explaining credit spreads.
Our main results are: i) the inclusion of a theoretical CDS spread in our regressions
improves the explanatory power of the fundamental variables. Our extended model is able
to explain 54% of the variations in CDS spreads in the pre-crisis period (from January 2002
to June 2007) and 51% in the crisis period (from July 2007 to March 2009), which is higher
4More detailed information about the CDS market can be found in European Central Bank, 2009b.
6than previous ndings of studies on corporate bond and CDS spread changes; ii) when
the theoretical spread calculated from the Merton model is introduced in the regressions,
the coecient of equity volatility decreases signicantly; that of leverage, on the contrary,
maintains its usefulness in explaining CDS spread changes; iii) the contribution of leverage
to the explanation of CDS spread changes is much higher during the crisis than before, as
investors appear to have become more aware of individual risk factors; at the same time,
the impact of equity volatility substantially decreases, possibly because the large swings
in implied volatility that have characterized the crisis period have made this indicator a
poor proxy for long-term asset volatility; iv) the overall capacity of the model to explain
CDS changes is almost the same before and during the turmoil, thus highlighting that the
underlying risk factors identied by the literature as relevant for the pricing of the credit
risk have maintained their explanatory power also in a period of remarkable stress for the
CDS market; v) during the crisis CDS spreads appear to have been moving increasingly
together, driven by a common factor that our model was able to explain only in part.
The following section surveys the literature on the determinants of credit spreads and
on previous empirical studies. In Section 3 we describe the model introduced by Merton
(1974) and the way in which it can be used to estimate model-based CDS spreads. In
Section 4 we describe the dataset and the statistical methodology used in the paper to
look for the determinants of CDS spread movements. Our results are reported in Section
5 and Section 6 concludes.
2. A review of the literature on credit spreads
This section brie
y reviews the main contributions to the literature on the determinants
of credit spreads. Early research on this topic has focused on assessing how much of
observed bond spreads can be explained by structural default factors, that is by factors
that theoretical models of default suggest are linked to credit risk. Then, having observed
that bond spreads predicted by theoretical models are generally much lower than observed
spreads, the academic research has turned its attention to investigating the origins of such
unexplained extra yields, testing for alternative hypotheses.
2.1. Main determinants of credit spreads
Credit risk models are usually divided into structural and reduced-form models.5 Under
the rst approach the liabilities of a rm are seen as a contingent claim on the assets of
the rm itself and default occurs when the market value of the assets, which is modeled
as a stochastic process, reaches some limit. The reduced-form approach, instead, postu-
lates that default occurs randomly, due to some exogenous factor(s) whose probability of
occurring, dubbed the \intensity", is modeled and calibrated using market data. Models
belonging to this latter class are also called intensity-based models. Reduced-form models
5Giesecke (2004) provides an interesting survey of both approaches. He also introduces the incomplete
information approach that, strictly speaking, can be seen as an extension of the structural approach.
7have been praised by practitioners because of their capacity, by construction, to t mar-
ket data, but structural models have been usually seen by academics as better suited to
analyzing the determinants of credit risk. Although the capacity of individual structural
models to describe the actual behavior of credit risk is still a matter of debate (e.g. An-
derson and Sundaresan, 2000, Eom et al., 2004, Tarashev, 2005, and Ericsson et al., 2007),
during the last few years there has been a new strand of literature that, departing from
any specic model, aimed at measuring the explanatory power for observed credit spreads
of the variables that structural models predict are theoretically linked to credit risk.
The rst structural model on credit risk was introduced by Merton (1974) and because
of its importance is described in detail in the next section. For the moment it will suce
to say that in the Merton model a default occurs when the market value of the rm, which
is assumed to be described by a random process, is below the face value of the outstanding
debt at the maturity of the debt itself. In that case the shareholders give the assets of
the rm up to the bondholders. Merton's intuition was that a bond subject to credit risk
can be seen as a combination of a long position in a risk-free bond and short position in
a European put option sold to the shareholders with a strike price equal to the face value
of the risky bond. In this setting, the price of the risky bond can be determined through
standard option pricing methods which link its value to the parameters of the stochastic
process driving the rm value and to the level of outstanding debt. The prediction of the
Merton model is that credit spreads should be a function of the following variables:
i) risk-free interest rate: the risk-free interest rate represents the drift of the process
describing the value of the assets of the rm under the risk-neutral measure. Higher
interest rates increase the future expected value of the assets, thus reducing credit
spreads;
ii) nominal outstanding amount of debt: the nominal value of the debt represents the
threshold at which default is triggered. A higher amount of debt makes default more
likely so that higher credit spreads are expected;
iii) rm value: higher values for the assets of the rm make the regular payment of the
debt more likely and credit spreads are expected to be lower;
iv) asset volatility: higher asset volatility increases the value of the put option granted
to the shareholders, thus increasing the compensation required by the bondholders
through higher credit spreads.
The aim of the Merton model and other structural models is to explain the share of
the bond spreads which arises from credit risk using a small number of factors such as
those just described. However, there are other factors not linked to credit risk that have
been shown to be a non-negligible part of bond spreads. These include:
i) taxes, to the extent that credit instruments and government bonds are subject to
dierent tax rates;
ii) liquidity, as risky credit instruments have lower volumes and higher transaction costs
than government bonds;
8iii) supply and demand shocks, which can aect both corporate and government bond
markets;
iv) systematic risk factors, such as those prevailing in the equity and in the corporate
bond markets (e.g. Elton et al., 2001).
During the last few years these additional factors have led to a growing empirical liter-
ature on credit spreads that has used the CDS market as its object of research. Working
on CDS quotes has at least three advantages with respect to using bond spreads. First,
the CDS market already quotes in terms of a \spread", so that it is not necessary to
introduce another market in the analysis, like that of government bonds, which can be
subject to its own specic factors. Second, CDS contracts are rather standardized, while
bonds are characterized by non-homogeneity in terms of coupons, maturities, outstand-
ing amounts, embedded options, and so on, which make comparisons dicult. Finally,
because of the nature of CDSs as derivatives contracts, CDS quotes should be less prone
to supply and demand eects than the bond market, which is constrained by the physical
nature of bonds.
2.2. Empirical studies
Given the relatively recent development of the CDS market, empirical work on the de-
terminants of credit risk has traditionally looked at corporate spreads. A rst group of
empirical studies identies factors that can explain why corporate spreads are much larger
than what would be predicted by historical rates of default and recovery rates (the so-
called \credit spread puzzle"). Elton et al. (2001) identify the expected default loss, a tax
premium, and a risk premium for the systematic, and thus not diversiable, part of the risk
on corporate bonds, as the main components of credit spreads. Following the same line
of research, Driessen (2005) shows that risk premia for liquidity and jump-to-default risks
are also important components of bond spreads. Amato and Remolona (2005) propose an
alternative explanation for the \credit spread puzzle" arguing that, while previous studies
mostly focused on the expected loss component of credit risk, extra spreads may actually
compensate for non-diversiable credit risk. Their argument is that the high degree of
skewness in bond returns makes diversication more dicult: the size of the portfolio re-
quired to reduce the probability of extreme losses by diversication is actually very large
and thus dicult to attain in practice. Due to this diculty investors in corporate bonds
would require additional premia in the form of higher spreads.
A second group of studies on corporate spreads departs from trying to reconcile his-
torical default losses with observed credit premia and instead aims at explaining credit
spreads in a purely statistical way by regressing (changes in) observed spreads on (changes
in) factors that theoretical models suggest are relevant in determining both default and
non-default components of credit spreads. The advantage of this approach is that it allows
the impact of any single fundamental factor on credit spreads to be estimated directly.
Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) initiate this strand of research by showing how factors that
should represent the main explanatory variables for credit spreads, according to structural
9default models, actually explain only 25% of observed bond spread changes. They also
show that the missing component is represented by a common risk factor which is inde-
pendent of equity, swap and Treasury returns. They conclude that bond spread changes
are mostly driven by supply and demand shocks which are specic to the corporate bond
market and independent of both default and liquidity factors. Campbell and Taksler
(2003) focus on the eect of equity volatility on corporate bond yields. They show that
idiosyncratic rm-level volatility can explain as much cross-sectional variation in yields as
can credit ratings. In the same vein, Guazzarotti (2004) investigates the determinants of
changes in individual credit spreads of non-nancial European corporate bonds by look-
ing at the relevance of both structural default factors (like leverage, asset volatility, and
the level and slope of the risk-free yield curve) and of some non credit-risk factors (e.g.
market liquidity and market risk). He nds that: i) default risk factors account for less
than 20% of total variation of credit spreads; ii) liquidity risk and aggregate market risk
factors, although signicant, explain only an additional 10%; iii) the remaining part of
credit spread changes remains unexplained. More recently, Avramov et al. (2007) ana-
lyze the capacity of structural models to explain changes in corporate credit risk using a
set of common factors and company-level fundamentals. They are able to explain more
than 54% (67%) of the variation in credit spread changes for medium-grade (low-grade)
bonds with no clearly dominant latent factor left in the unexplained variation. Cremers
et al. (2008) introduce measures of volatility and jump risks that are based on individual
stock options to explain bond spreads. They show that implied volatilities of individual
options contain useful information for credit spreads and improve on historical volatilities
when explaining the cross-sectional and time-series variations in a panel of corporate bond
spreads.
Turning to the empirical analysis on CDS spreads, one of the rst papers on the topic is
that by Aunon-Nerin et al. (2002). As the credit derivatives market was still in its infancy
when that paper was written, the sample of CDSs which has been used is rather small
and with a predominance of nancial companies. Moreover, the analysis is conducted on
the levels of the variables thus leaving the door open to econometric problems related to
the non-stationary nature of the data.6 Greatrex (2008) digs deeper into the relevance of
these econometric issues for the study of the determinants of CDS spreads and shows that
variables commonly used for this kind of analysis are usually non-stationary in levels but
stationary in rst dierences; running regressions on non-stationary variables could result
in high values for the R2 statistics but also in inecient coecient estimates, sub-optimal
forecasts, and invalid signicance tests (Granger and Newbold, 1974). Ericsson et al.
(2009), in a paper circulating since 2004, use data for the period 1999-2002 and show that
estimated coecients of a limited number of theoretical determinants of default risk are
consistent with the theory. Among these factors, volatility and leverage have substantial
explanatory power. Moreover, a principal component analysis of spreads and residuals
indicates limited evidence for a residual common factor, conrming that the variables
explain a signicant amount of the variation in the data. Zhang et al. (2005) focus on
information arising from the equity market. They show that volatility and jump risk
measures derived from the equity market using high frequency data, together with credit
6More recently, Abid and Naifar (2006) performed an analysis on CDS spread levels.
10ratings, macroeconomic conditions, and rms' balance sheet information, can explain up
to 77% of the total variation of CDS spreads. However, their results are obtained using
variables in levels and are subject to the same econometric problems mentioned above.
More recently, some works have focussed on CDSs on banks and on the dierences between
the periods before and after the recent nancial crisis. Annaert et al. (2009) show that:
i) the determinants of changes in bank CDS spreads exhibit signicant time variation; ii)
variables suggested by structural credit risk models are not signicant in explaining bank
CDS spread changes, either in the period prior to the crisis or in the crisis period itself; iii)
some of the variables used as proxies of the general economic conditions are signicant, but
the magnitude of the coecient estimates and their sign have changed over time. Raunig
and Scheicher (2009) also nd the crisis had an impact on the pricing of CDSs on banks.
In particular, they show that the perception of bank credit risk by market participants
approaches the level of the most risky non-bank companies.
3. Merton Model
As we already mentioned, Merton (1974) introduces the rst model of credit risk based on
the structural approach. Merton assumes that the whole debt of a rm is represented by
a zero-coupon bond maturing at time T, with face value D. Moreover, the market value
of the rm's assets Vt between 0 and T follows a geometric Brownian motion given by
dVt = rVtdt + VtdWt (1)
where r and  are constants representing, respectively, the risk-free interest rate and the
volatility of the process. Merton assumes that a default occurs if the value of the rm at
time T is lower than D. In that case the ownership of the rm is transferred from the
shareholders to the creditors. In this framework the creditors of the rm can be seen as
holding a long position in a risk-free zero-coupon bond and a short position in a European
put option granted to the shareholders. The underlying of the option is represented by
the assets of the rm, the strike price is equal to D and the maturity is T. The spread
between corporate and government yields is the compensation required by creditors for
selling the put option.
Similarly, the equity value can be seen as the value of a European call on the assets
of the rm, with the strike price equal to D and maturity T. The value of equity at time
T, denoted ET, is thus given by max(0;VT   D). Using standard option valuation tools
(Black and Scholes, 1973), one obtains
Et = VtN(d1)   e r(T t)DN(d2) (2)
at time t < T, where
d1 =




d2 = d1   
p
T   t
and N(x) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function evaluated at x. The
value of the debt at time t, which we denote with Dt, is thus equal to Vt   Et. It is also
11possible to recover the expected costs of default Ct as the dierence between the face value
of the debt, discounted at the risk-free rate, and the actual value of the debt, that is
Ct = e r(T t)D   Dt
In this simple framework, in which the default can occur only at the maturity of the debt,
the annual spread st of a CDS with quarterly payments and T years to maturity is such






















In order to use the Merton model to estimate the CDS spread it is thus necessary
to have four ingredients: the level of the risk-free interest rate, the face value of the
rm's total debt, its market value and the volatility of its assets. Although the last two
variables are not directly observable, for listed rms it is nonetheless possible to observe
the market value of equity and to estimate the historical volatility. In the case in which
there are options written on the shares of the rm it is also possible to have a forward-
looking measure of the equity volatility, which is the volatility implied by stock option
prices. Equity value and equity volatility can therefore be used directly as proxies for
asset value and asset volatility. However, they can also be used to obtain estimates of
asset value and asset volatility. In fact, applying Ito's lemma the dynamics of Et is given
by a geometric Brownian motion with diusion coecient equal to Vt
dEt
dVt , where the last
term is the derivative of the equity with respect to the value of the assets (a quantity
commonly called \the delta"), and is equal to N(d1). Under the further assumption that
the dynamics of the equity can be described by a geometric Brownian motion with diusion





Given the other observable variables, it is thus possible to solve using numerical methods
the system of non-linear equations (2) and (3) for the values of the two unknown variables
Vt and .
Figure 1 shows the theoretical spread st on a 5-year CDS obtained using the Merton
model as a function of the volatility of the equity (Panel A), for three dierent levels of
the ratio of total assets (At = D+Et) to equity (Et) { the denition of leverage we adopt
throughout the paper { and as a function of the leverage (Panel B), for three dierent
levels of volatility. The risk-free interest rate is assumed to be xed at 4%. All values are
in percentages except for the CDS spread which is in basis points. As made clear by the
gure, the main driver of the CDS spread in the Merton model is the level of volatility.
When the volatility of the equity falls below 30, the CDS spread is almost negligible, no
matter what the leverage is. In fact, for E = 30 the theoretical CDS spread is still below
10 basis points even when the amount of debt is twice the value of equity (leverage=300).
As the level of equity volatility increases, the theoretical CDS spread surges sharply and the
12relative (absolute) dierence among rms with dierent leverages decreases (increases). If
Panel A shows that the relationship between the theoretical CDS spread and the volatility
of the equity is non-linear, an even stronger non-linearity arises when the theoretical CDS
spread is expressed as a function of the leverage. Panel B, in fact, not only conrms the
relevance of the equity volatility for the level of the theoretical spread but also shows a
non-monotone relationship between the CDS spread and the leverage of the rm. This
pattern arises from the fact that, when numerically solving equations (2) and (3), it turns
out that higher levels of debt are associated with lower levels of asset volatility. This
is because the higher the leverage the lower the weight the equity volatility receives as
an estimator of the volatility of the whole value of the rm. Hence, at some point the
negative impact that the higher debt has on the credit risk of the rm starts to be more
than compensated by the positive impact of a decreasing asset volatility.
The Merton model, due to its simplicity, provides a nice tool for understanding how
fundamental variables, such as leverage and asset volatility, aect credit spreads. However,
there are several features of real nancial markets that are not taken into account by the
model and that have led to many other extensions. 7 The three main drawbacks of the
model are:
1. There is only one kind of debt securities. In the Merton model only the case of
a single zero-coupon bond is considered. Not only do most corporate bonds pay
coupons but rms usually issue several kinds of bonds with dierent characteristics;
2. Default occurs only at the maturity of the debt and if and only if the value of
the assets is below the face value of the debt. In the real world default can occur
at any time before the maturity of the debt if the rm fails to meet any kind of
obligation, such as the payment of coupons. Moreover, bankruptcy is a process that
usually involves several forms of cost which can result in models with default barriers
dierent from the face value of the debt (e.g. Leland and Toft, 1996);
3. Volatility is assumed to be constant for all maturities. Empirical work on option
pricing shows that implied volatility is not constant, neither for dierent strikes nor
for dierent maturities. This means that volatility implied by equity options, which
have maturity usually up to one year, could be a biased estimator of the volatility
of equity over longer horizons.
All these caveats have to be borne in mind when evaluating the results of any empirical
application of the Merton model like the one we describe in the next section.
4. Methodology
In this section we describe the data, the model and the statistical methodology used in
our analysis.
7For several extensions of the Merton model, see Cossin and Pirotte (2001) and references therein.
134.1. Data description
We started by selecting all CDS contracts in US dollars available through Bloomberg
with maturity equal to 5 years (which are usually the most liquid contracts), written on
the senior debt of US non-nancial rms. We used end-of-day mid quotes for CDSs. In
order to have data on market capitalization we restricted our sample to listed rms. For
each company we gathered quarterly data on current liabilities, non-current liabilities, and
cash and equivalents, from Bloomberg for the period between January 2002 and March
2009. We also collected daily data on companies' market capitalization, stock returns,
and implied volatility derived from equity options. We then selected those contracts for
which we could recover all data for at least 3 years, ending up with a sample of 167
companies. As a proxy of the risk-free interest rate curve we used the zero-coupon curve
calculated by Datastream on US government bonds. We also collected daily data on the
average levels of credit spreads for AA and BBB-rated US industrial companies (the option-
adjusted spreads for the Merrill Lynch corporate industrial indices for US companies with
AA and BBB ratings), a broad US equity market index (the S&P Composite index),
and a broad index of US market implied volatility (the VIX index). In our regressions
we use monthly average data for CDS spreads and for all other daily nancial indicators.
Quarterly balance sheet data were linearly interpolated. In order to control for the quality
of CDS data we dropped daily observations whenever equal to the value of the previous
day; we also dropped those monthly observations based on less than 5 daily data. Our
nal dataset, after dropping any rm-month observation with one or more missing values,
includes 11,084 rm-month observations: 8,140 in the pre-crisis period (from January 2002
to June 2007) and 2,944 in the crisis period (from July 2007 to March 2009).
The historical behavior of a few of our variables is shown in Figure 2. The plot shows
the huge increase of CDS spreads after the onset of the nancial crisis. It also makes
apparent the negative relationships of CDS spreads with stock returns and government
bond yields as well as the positive relationship with the level of volatility. All these facts
are coherent with the theory underlying the Merton model. Some descriptive statistics
of our dataset are reported in tables 1 to 2. As mentioned earlier, average CDS spreads
increase sharply in the crisis period, from 87 to 199 basis points (Table 1). As expected,
average CDS spreads increase with leverage (Table 2). They are much higher for rms
in the Consumer cyclical and the Communication/Technology sectors (respectively, 137
and 93 basis points before the crisis and 392 and 200 basis points in the crisis period;
Table 3). The theoretical spreads derived from the Merton model are consistently much
lower than the observed ones (the average values in the whole sample period are 71 and
116, respectively); however, they appear to replicate spread variations through sectors and
leverage classes rather well. Leverage and implied volatility also rise drastically during
the crisis. Leverage is highest in the Utilities and Consumer cyclical sectors, lowest in
Communication/Technology. Volatility is highest in the Consumer cyclical sector and
lowest in the Consumer non-cyclical and Utilities sectors.
144.2. Empirical models and testing methodology
As described in Section 3, the Merton model posits that credit spreads are a function of
the value and volatility of the assets, the face value and maturity of the debt and the
risk-free interest rate. As discussed in that section, the Merton model also implies that
the relationship between CDS spreads and default factors is highly non-linear.
In order to test for the capacity of the Merton model to explain observed CDS spreads,
we run the following univariate regression:
s(i;t) = 0 + 1 s(i;t) + (i;t); (Model 1)
where i = 1;:::;n denotes a specic rm and t = 1;:::;m a specic time period. The
variable  s is the theoretical CDS spread calculated using the Merton model with the
following assumptions: the face value of the debt, whose maturity is assumed to be equal
to 5 years, is equal to the total of balance sheet liabilities net of cash; the value of the
equity is equal to the market capitalization of the rm; the volatility of the equity is
equal to the mean of implied volatilities calculated from call and put options; the risk-free
interest rate is given by the 5-year zero-coupon rate on US government bonds.
Since Model 1 may not be able to fully describe the relationship between observed
CDS spreads and default factors because of its simplifying assumptions, we also estimate
the following three-factor linear model which has been used in other empirical works on
the determinants of CDS spreads (e.g. Ericsson et al., 2009):
s(i;t) = 0 + 1E(i;t) + 2L(i;t) + 3r(t) + (i;t): (Model 2)
As for the explanatory variables, E is the implied volatility calculated as the mean of
implied volatilities derived from call and put options, L is the leverage calculated as the
ratio of total assets (current and non-current liabilities, net of cash and equivalents, plus
market capitalization) to market capitalization, and r is the 5-year zero-coupon rate on
US government bonds. We opted to use implied volatility as a proxy of equity volatility to
partially correct for the backward-looking nature of the historical volatility of share prices
and because of its superiority in explaining CDS spreads (see Campbell and Taksler, 2003).
If the non-linearities implied by the Merton model had some additional explanatory
power we would expect that, once we add the theoretical spread to the linear model,
the portion of total variation explained by the model increases and the linear terms lose
signicance. Thus, we also estimate a third model which is a combination of the previous
two models:
s(i;t) = 0 + 1 s(i;t) + 2E(i;t) + 3L(i;t) + 4r(i;t) + (i;t): (Model 3)
Finally, we estimate an extended model in which we include other variables, generally
used in the literature on the determinants of credit spreads, such as the (log) returns of
the rms' stocks, the slope of the yield curve (the dierence between the 10-year and the
1-year zero-coupon rates on US government bonds), an index of the premium required by
investors to hold riskier assets (the dierence between the average OASs of the Merrill
15Lynch indices for US industrial companies with BBB and AA ratings), an equity market
index (the log of the S&P Composite index), and an index of market uncertainty (the VIX
index).
s(i;t) = 0 + 1 s(i;t) + 2E(i;t) + 3L(i;t) + 4r(i;t)
+ 5STOCK(t) + 6SLOPE(t) + 7OAS(t)
+ 8SPCI(t) + 9V IX(t) + (i;t): (Model 4)
The expected signs for the additional variables are:
 STOCK: a negative sign is expected, as higher stock values should signal higher
future protability and higher capacity of the rms to meet their obligations;
 SLOPE: the sign is uncertain. On the one hand, higher values for the slope should
predict higher future risk-free rates, which should have a negative impact on CDS
spreads. On the other hand, the increase in expected future interest rates may reduce
the number of protable projects available to the company and, in turn, increase
credit spreads. Moreover, it has to be pointed out that we are already including a
5-year interest rate in our regressions. In our setting, a higher level for the slope
would imply, ceteris paribus, a lower level for the short-term interest rate which is
usually associated with worsening economic conditions and higher credit spreads;
 OAS: a positive sign is expected, as the higher the premium required by investors to
hold riskier securities the higher should be the compensation required to hold credit
risk;
 SPCI: the sign is uncertain. On the one hand a broad market increase of equity
values should signal better economic conditions and a lower probability of default
for the companies, and have a negative impact on CDS spreads. On the other hand,
in our regressions we have already included individual stock returns that should take
into account rm-specic expectations about protability much better than broad
market measures. In our setting, a broad market increase of equity values signals,
ceteris paribus, a relatively bad performance of individual rms, so that a positive
eect on CDS spreads could otherwise be expected;
 V IX: a positive sign is expected, as the higher the uncertainty in the market the
higher the value of the put option that the bondholders implicitly sell to the share-
holders when buying credit risk.
The four models are estimated in rst-dierences by running pooled OLS regressions
with standard errors that allow for time correlation at rm level. As we said, models in
rst-dierences are preferred to those in levels in order to isolate unobserved individual fac-
tors which do not vary over time and account for the possible problem of non-stationarity
of the processes for CDS spreads.8 As a robustness check, we also estimate Model 4 with
8We found that the augmented Dickey-Fuller test, run separately for each CDS time series, does not
reject the null hypothesis of the presence of a unit-root in almost all cases.
16a panel regression with xed eects.9
We then compare the results across groups of rms dened according to the level
of leverage or the economic sector. We abstract from factors not linked to credit risk
which the literature has documented are signicant in the corporate bond market (such
as taxes, liquidity and supply and demand shocks) on the assumption that for the CDS
market they are less relevant. However, we recognize that the lack of liquidity in the CDS
market following the onset of the crisis could have an impact on our estimates and so
we try to control for that by using the CDS bid-ask spread change as an instrument to
distinguish between contracts that were hit by dierent liquidity shocks during the crisis.
In particular, we run a set of regressions for subgroups of contracts dened according to
the size of the change in the average bid-ask spread on CDS contracts from before to after
the onset of the crisis.10
Finally, we perform a principal component analysis on CDS spread changes and re-
gression residuals from Model 4 in order to assess to what extent the model reduces the
weight of the rst components of spreads variation. This analysis is conducted on a bal-
anced sub-sample of 34 rms with complete monthly data from January 2003 to December
2008.
5. Results
In this section we report the results of our estimates. In order to have a comparison with
previous literature we rst discuss results for the four models presented in Section 4 in the
pre-crisis period (January 2002 to June 2007) and then we asses how results change after
the onset of the crisis (July 2007 to March 2009).
5.1. The pre-crisis period
As shown in Table 4, by regressing observed CDS spreads on the theoretical spreads
obtained using the Merton model for the period before the onset of the crisis we nd
that, as expected, the coecient of the theoretical spread (0.32) is positive and highly
signicant, and the explanatory power of the model (adjusted R2 statistics equal to 0.25) is
comparable to previous studies on the determinants of CDS spread changes (e.g. Ericsson
et al., 2009). However, the coecient is signicantly dierent from the value of one that
is predicted by theory.
Turning to Model 2, all the estimated coecients have the expected signs and are
strongly signicant. In particular, a one percentage point increase in the levels of volatility
9The test by Hausman (1978) implies that the model with random eects cannot be rejected; a panel
data analysis with random eects did not result in appreciable dierences.
10We were not able to estimate directly the eect of liquidity on spreads as our dependent variable
is dened as the average between the bid and the ask prices and adding the bid-ask spread as an extra
right-hand variable would have resulted in a misspecied model. For a study on the determinants of CDS
bid-ask spreads, see Meng and ap Gwilym (2008).
17and leverage raises the CDS spread by 2.72 and 0.35 basis points, respectively. A similar
increase in the interest rate level determines a drop of 3.56 basis points for the CDS spread.
The adjusted R2 statistics (0.48) is much higher than in Model 1; this aspect suggests that
the Merton model constrains the eects of the single factors on CDS spreads in ways that
are not fully consistent with market data.
In Model 3, where the theoretical spread is added to the more traditional three-factors
model, the coecients of the theoretical spread, volatility and interest rate are all lower
in absolute terms when compared with the previous models. Moreover, the coecient
of volatility shows a large loss of signicance, which is probably due to the high level of
correlation with the theoretical spread (70 per cent). The linear contribution of leverage,
on the contrary, remains basically unchanged and highly signicant; this could be due to
the fact that the Merton model is not very sensitive to changes in leverage (see Figure 1).
The adjusted R2 statistics increases further from 0.48 to 0.52, highlighting the positive
contribution to the model of the theoretical spread, which should partly take into account
the non-linearities embedded in the pricing of CDSs.
In Model 4, the other explanatory variables that the literature has indicated as impor-
tant determinants of credit spreads (such as, individual stock returns, the slope of the yield
curve, an indicator of risk aversion in the bond market, and a broad market stock index
return) have the expected signs and all but the indicator of broad market uncertainty (the
VIX index) have signicant eects on CDS spreads.11 However, their overall contribution
to the explanatory power of the model is marginal, as the adjusted R2 statistic only rises
from 0.52 to 0.54.
Tables 5 shows that results obtained running a panel regression with xed eects
conrm those obtained with the pooled OLS regression, both in terms of absolute values
and the signicance of the coecients. We also checked that our results are robust to the
ltering procedures applied to the original data such as the dropping of stale quotations
and of observations referring to months with few CDS quotes. We also veried that results
remain basically unchanged when we limit the analysis to a balanced dataset including
only a subset of companies with complete data in the period from 2003 to 2008.
All in all, results suggest that factors predicted by the theory as being relevant for
credit spreads have indeed a good explanatory power. Moreover, the theoretical spread
calculated using the Merton model does convey specic information on credit risk that
cannot be captured by the linear models, supporting the hypothesis that non-linearities
are important in explaining credit spreads.
5.2. The crisis period
The nancial crisis has disrupted credit markets, causing spreads and volatility to surge
and market liquidity to evaporate (e.g. International Monetary Fund, 2008). The impact
of these events on the pricing of credit risk is a matter of debate. On the one hand, one
might expect that the crisis, by amplifying the importance of systemic risk factors, has
11The coecients of SLOPE and SPCI, whose signs are theoretically uncertain, are positive.
18caused a generalized increase of spreads (almost) independently from the fundamental
characteristics of rms. On the other hand, the crisis could have exacerbated the dier-
ences between rms belonging to dierent classes of risk, as investors have become more
aware of idiosyncratic risk factors. In order to assess the impact of the nancial crisis on
the pricing of risk, we compare the results in the pre-crisis period with those obtained
during the crisis period. Table 4 reports the results of the regressions for our four models
in both periods, as well as the tests on the dierences between the two periods.
As for Model 1, the striking fact is the drop in both the coecient of the theoretical
spread and the explanatory power of the model, from 0.32 and 25% before the start of the
crisis, to 0.20 and just 7%, respectively. This indicates that during the crisis the empirical
relationship between CDS spreads and default factors is no longer described by the specic
functional form of the Merton model.
This interpretation is conrmed by looking at the results from Model 2, where the
default factors are included in the regression separately and the functional form between
the default factors and the CDS spreads is not determined by the theoretical model. In
this case we actually nd a moderate increase in the explanatory power of the model from
before to during the crisis. Moreover, all the coecients maintain the expected signs and
are highly signicant. However, the impact of equity volatility on CDS spreads more than
halves, suggesting that the wide swings in implied volatility, which have characterized the
crisis period, have probably made this indicator a poor proxy for long-term asset volatility.
This fact could also explain the loss of importance in Model 1 of the theoretical spread,
which is mostly driven by volatility changes (see Figure 1). At the same time, during
the crisis spreads have become much more sensitive to changes in leverage (from 0.35 to
0.92) and interest rates (from -3.56 to -41.21). On the one hand, the increased importance
of leverage may re
ect a greater awareness by investors of rm-specic characteristics.
On the other hand, the increased relevance of interest rates probably re
ects the fact that
during the crisis risk-free interest rates have been interpreted as better proxies of economic
activity: lower interest rates should signal worse economic conditions and higher credit
risks.
Changes in the results of Model 3 from the pre-crisis period to the crisis period are
rather similar to those of Model 2, given the negligible impact of the theoretical spread
during the crisis.
In Model 4, the interest rate coecient also loses its signicance during the crisis,
possibly in favor of the slope of the yield curve. Given the negative relationship between
the slope of the yield curve and short-term interest rates, for a given level of longer
term yields { for which our regressions already control for { the positive coecient on
the slope of the yield curve seems to indicate that the CDS market has been looking
at short-term interest rates as a better indicator of economic activity than longer-term
interest rates. Lower short-term rates (and a higher slope) are associated with worsening
economic conditions and greater CDS spreads.
Overall, during the crisis the proportion of explained variations decreases only slightly,
from 54% to 51% in Model 4, conrming that the model works rather well also in this
case. This result highlights that the underlying risk factors identied by the literature as
19relevant for the pricing of credit risk have maintained their explanatory power also in a
period of remarkable stress for the CDS market. In this regard, the CDS market appears
to have continued to price credit risk in much the same fashion as it did before the crisis.
Table 5 shows that our estimates for the crisis period are also conrmed by a panel
regression with xed eects.
Finally, we performed a principal component analysis on CDS spread changes and
regression residuals from Model 4. The analysis shows that during the crisis CDS spreads
appear to have been moving increasingly together, as reported in Figure 3. The fraction
of CDS variations explained by the rst component increases from 45% to 62% during
the crisis period. When the analysis is repeated using the residuals of Model 4, the two
values drop to 25% and 40%, respectively, thus conrming the ability of the model to
capture a substantial part of the common factors underlying the spread changes. Our
result suggests that spread changes during the crisis are increasingly driven by common
or systematic factors and less by rm-specic factors. In order to take into account
time varying factors, we repeated the analysis including monthly dummy variables but
the ndings were mostly unchanged. Given that general indicators of economic activity,
uncertainty, and risk aversion are already included in our model, our results seem to point
to the presence of a market-specic factor that hit CDSs during the crisis in forms that
are not fully re
ected in other markets. A large part of CDS spread variations during the
crisis is thus still to be explained.
5.3. Further analyses
In order to dig deeper into previous results we repeated the analysis based on Model 4
on sub-groups of rms dened according to the level of leverage, the economic sector, and
the size of the change in the average bid-ask spreads for CDSs from before to during the
crisis.
Analysis by leverage quartiles
In Table 6 we report the results for an analysis based on the average level of leverage of
the rms. First of all, we note that the explanatory power of the model is highest for the
companies with leverage in the highest quartile (0.63 in the pre-crisis period) and lowest
for the companies in the lowest quartile (0.25). As the two groups are also associated
with the highest and lowest levels of CDS spreads, these results conrm previous ndings
that structural models can better explain the credit spreads for rms with relatively lower
credit quality (e.g. Collin-Dufresne et al. 2001, for an analysis on corporate spreads, and
Greatrex, 2008, for comparable results on CDSs). We also note that for rms with low
leverage the explanatory power of the model increases substantially during the crisis, to
0.35. The increased explanatory power of the model for rms with low levels of leverage
does not derive from factors related to rm-specic characteristics (such as leverage and
volatility), but from market-wide factors such as the interest rate and the market price
of risk (as captured by the signicant increase of the coecient of the corporate bond
20spread). For rms with the highest levels of leverage, the leverage itself is the variable
whose coecient increased more signicantly during the crisis, pointing to the fact the
investors became more concerned about the particular weaknesses of the balance sheets
of those rms.
Analysis by economic sector
Table 7 reports the results for the sectoral analysis. We notice that, across sectors, the
model explains the highest proportion of variation for companies in the Utilities and Con-
sumer Cyclical sectors, which are also the ones with the highest levels of leverage. During
the crisis model performance sharply increases for rms in the Basic materials/Energy
and Consumer non cyclical sectors, which are characterized by relatively low levels of
leverage, volatility, and CDS spreads, probably re
ecting the fact that these rms have
been perceived as relatively riskier than before the crisis. Actually, for these sectors the
theoretical spreads calculated using the Merton model show the highest levels of relative
increase from before to after the onset of the crisis (see Table 3). Overall, this is further
evidence of the capacity of the model to price CDSs of riskier companies better.
Analysis by liquidity change
In order to check whether the change of liquidity in the CDS market had any impact
on the capacity of the model to explain CDS spread variations, we repeated our analysis
on the basis of the bid-ask spread on CDS contracts. In particular, we grouped rms
into four quartiles according to the change in the average bid-ask spread they experienced
from before to after the onset of the crisis. The results are reported in Table 8. The
interesting result is that the overall explanatory power of the model remains broadly the
same during the crisis period for both the contracts in the lowest and highest quartiles
of bid-ask spread changes. For rms in the highest quartile, moreover, all coecients of
the regression, except for that related to leverage, do not show any signicant change
during the crisis. These results suggest that the lack of liquidity experienced in the CDS
market during the crisis, as proxied by larger bid-ask spreads, did not modify the basic
relationships between CDS spread changes and their explanatory factors.
6. Conclusion
In this paper we analyze the determinants of CDS spread changes (based on a sample of 167
US non-nancial rms over the period between January 2002 and March 2009), using the
variables that the literature has found to have a theoretical and empirical impact on CDS
spreads. We include in our regressions the theoretical spread implied by the Merton model
in order to deal with the non-linear relationships between the individual characteristics of
the rms and CDS spreads. We nd that the inclusion of this additional term improves the
capacity of changes in the fundamental variables to explain changes in CDS spreads. When
the theoretical spread calculated using the Merton model is introduced in the regressions,
21the coecient of the equity volatility decreases signicantly, because of the high sensitivity
of the Merton model to this parameter. On the contrary, leverage, which has only second-
order eects on the theoretical spreads, maintains its usefulness in explaining CDS spread
changes. The extended model is able to explain 54% of the variations in CDS spreads in
the pre-crisis period and 51% in the crisis period, which is higher than previous ndings
of studies on corporate bond and CDS spread changes.
We also analyze how the nancial crisis has changed the way in which credit risk is
priced in the CDS market. We nd that the contribution of the leverage of the rms to
the explanation of CDS spread changes is much higher during the crisis than before, as
investors appear to have become more aware of individual risk factors. At the same time,
the impact of equity volatility substantially decreases, possibly because the large swings
in implied volatility during the crisis period have made this indicator a poor proxy for
long-term asset volatility. We also nd that the overall capacity of the model to explain
CDS changes is almost the same before and during the turmoil, thus highlighting that the
underlying risk factors identied by the literature as relevant for the pricing of the credit
risk have maintained their explanatory power even in a period of remarkable stress for the
CDS market.
Finally, we show that during the crisis CDS spreads appear to have been moving
increasingly together, driven by a common factor that our model was only partly able to
explain. Given that the model includes general indicators of economic activity, uncertainty,
and risk aversion, our results point to the presence of a market-specic factor that hit the
CDS market during the crisis in forms not fully re
ected in other markets. The exact
identication of this factor is an interesting topic for further research.
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25Tables and gures
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the data set
CDS spreads are end-of-day mid quotes. The theoretical spread is the spread calculated
using the Merton model. Leverage is dened as the ratio of total assets (total liabilities
plus market capitalization) to market capitalization. Volatility is the mean of implied
volatilities on call and put stock options. CDS spreads and theoretical spreads are
in basis points; leverage and volatility are in percentages; market capitalization is in
millions of US dollars.
Mean Median Standard Min. Max. deviation
Whole period (January 2002 { March 2009)
CDS spreads 116 54 221 6 7,995
Theoretical spreads 71 3 213 0 1,862
Leverage 219 175 190 94 6,044
Volatility 35 30 19 7 369
Market capitalization 25,939 13,616 39,549 58 420,623
Pre-crisis period (January 2002 { June 2007)
CDS spreads 87 47 122 6 2,811
Theoretical spreads 31 1 108 0 1,793
Leverage 214 174 162 94 4,420
Volatility 31 28 13 7 369
Market capitalization 25,951 13,555 39,810 481 386,416
Crisis period (July 2007 { March 2009)
CDS spreads 199 89 366 10 7,995
Theoretical spreads 184 23 348 0 1,862
Leverage 234 179 252 104 6,044
Volatility 47 39 25 7 223

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































29Table 5. The determinants of CDS spread changes:
pooled and panel regressions
The table compares the results from pooled OLS and panel xed-eect regressions run
on the same sample. Standard errors allow for time correlation at rm level. Monthly
data from January 2002 to March 2009; the pre-crisis period goes from January 2002
to June 2007; the post-crisis period from July 2007 to March 2009. The explanatory
variables are changes in the monthly averages of: the estimated theoretical spread for
rm i at time t; the implied volatility of options written on the stocks of rm i at time
t; the leverage ratio of rm i at time t; the 5-year zero-coupon interest rate on the US
government bond at time t; the log of the stock value of rm i at time t; the slope of
the zero-coupon curve on US government bonds (10-1 yrs) at time t; the Merrill Lynch
industrial bond average spread (BBB-AA) at time t; the log of the S&P Composite
stock index at time t; the VIX volatility index at time t; a constant term. Observed and
theoretical spreads and the corporate spread are in basis points, all other variables are
in percentages. Signicance levels: *** = 1%; ** = 5%; * = 10%.
Pre-crisis Crisis Dierence
Coe. t-Stud. Coe. t-Stud. Coe. t-Stud.
Pooled OLS regression
Theoretical spread 0:16 2:63  0:03  0:25  0:20  1:29
Volatility 0:99 1:25 1:67 0:60 0:68 0:24
Leverage 0:35 9:65 0:91 5:19 0:56 3:16
Interest rate  3:19  2:52  15:61  1:61  12:42  1:26
Stock return  0:42  3:57  0:17  0:32 0:26 0:51
Slope of yield curve 3:29 1:84 9:44 2:27 6:15 1:34
Corporate spreads 0:56 8:22 0:65 4:37 0:09 0:61
S&P Composite 1:01 4:27 1:01 1:64 0:00  0:01
VIX 0:27 0:65  0:53  0:44  0:79  0:61
Intercept 0:44 1:76  3:10  2:02  3:54  2:33
Adjusted R2 0.54 0.51
Panel xed eect regression
Theoretical spread 0:16 2:63  0:04  0:28  0:20  1:31
Volatility 0:96 1:22 1:62 0:61 0:69 0:24
Leverage 0:34 9:59 0:93 5:21 0:57 3:18
Interest rate  2:95  2:28  15:76  1:73  12:90  1:35
Stock return  0:44  3:59 0:05 0:09 0:34 0:68
Slope of yield curve 3:04 1:66 9:13 2:18 6:60 1:46
Corporate spreads 0:56 8:26 0:67 4:56 0:10 0:64
S&P Composite 1:05 4:29 0:70 1:10  0:12  0:20
VIX 0:30 0:75  0:50  0:43  0:80  0:62
Intercept 0:41 1:82  3:56  1:30  3:38  2:22
Adjusted R2 0.54 0.50



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Panel B: Spreads as a function of leverage
Equity volatility = 30
Equity volatility = 50
Equity volatility = 70
Figure 1. Theoretical CDS spreads generated by the Merton model
Theoretical CDS spreads on the debt of rms with dierent leverage (or equity
volatility) calculated using the Merton model, as a function of equity volatility
(or leverage). The spreads are supposed to be paid with a quarterly frequency,
the risk-free interest rate is constant and equal to 4% and the maturity of the
debt is 5 years. Leverage is dened as the ratio of total assets (total liabilities
plus market capitalization) to market capitalization. Theoretical CDS spreads
are in basis points; equity volatility and leverage are in percentages.
35Panel A: CDS spreads and S&P Composite
CDS spreads
S&P Composite (right-hand scale)
Panel B: Equity market volatility and risk-free interest rates
VIX
Risk-free interest rate (right-hand scale)
Figure 2. Time series of CDS spreads and other nancial series
Monthly averages. CDS spreads are in basis points; the risk-free interest rate is
in percentages and is the zero-coupon 5-year rate on US Government bonds.
36Panel A: Pre-crisis period: January 2003 { June 2007
CDS changes
Regression errors
Panel B: Crisis period: July 2007 { December 2008
CDS changes
Regression errors
Figure 3. Principal component analysis
The principal component analysis has been conducted on a balanced sub-sample
of 34 rms with complete data from January 2003 to December 2008 for the CDS
changes and the regression residuals of Model 4. The explained variations by the
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